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Unitary Judicial Review
Bradford R. Clark*
Introduction
Two hundred years have passed since the Supreme Court’s decision in
Marbury v. Madison,1 yet debate continues over the origins and legitimacy of
judicial review. Although modern commentators generally accept judicial
review with little or no reservation, some remain skeptical. One of the
strongest and most sustained challenges comes from Larry Kramer, who
believes that the Founders did not authorize judicial review of the scope of
federal powers under the original Constitution. At the same time, Kramer
maintains that the Founders expected judicial review both to prevent states
from undermining federal supremacy and to enforce individual rights. Such
attempts to divide judicial review, however, are inconsistent with the
constitutional text and contradict key assumptions held by the Founders. As
discussed below, the relevant materials suggest that judicial review is a
unitary doctrine under the Supremacy Clause that requires courts to treat all
parts of the Constitution as “the supreme Law of the Land”2 and to disregard
both state and federal law to the contrary.3
Brief elaboration is necessary to evaluate Professor Kramer’s thesis.
Kramer maintains that judicial review was not clearly established at the
Founding because it was inconsistent with prevailing notions of popular
sovereignty.
In his view, popular sovereignty emerged from “the
Revolutionary crisis of 1763–1776 . . . as the central principle of American
constitutionalism.”4 For this reason, the Constitution “was not ordinary law,”
but rather “a special form of popular law, law made by the people to bind their
governors.”5 According to Kramer, “in a regime of popular constitutionalism
it was not the judiciary’s responsibility to enforce the constitution against the
legislature. It was the people’s responsibility: a responsibility they discharged
mainly through elections, but also, if necessary, by more ‘revolutionary’
*

Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School. I thank Philip
Hamburger, Larry Kramer, John Manning, Jon Molot, Sai Prakash, Art Wilmarth, and John
Yoo for insightful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft. I also thank Brian
Wesoloski for outstanding research assistance.
1 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). For a recent reevaluation of
the conventional account of Marbury, see generally Louise Weinberg, Our Marbury, 89 VA.
L. REV. 1235 (2003).
2 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
3 The propriety of various judicial doctrines used to avoid and limit judicial review is
beyond the scope of this Article. For a thought-provoking analysis challenging the doctrine
of avoidance, see generally William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a
Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831 (2001). For the classic attempt to
reconcile judicial review and judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes, see
Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1983).
4 Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term—Foreward: We the Court, 115
HARV. L. REV. 4, 47 (2001).
5 Id. at 10.
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means.”6 In keeping with eighteenth century practice, the people could
enforce the Constitution through “the right to vote,”7 “the right to petition,”8
“the right of free speech,”9 the refusal of juries and grand juries to enforce
unconstitutional laws,10 and—as a last resort—”[m]ob action.”11
Based on these observations, Professor Kramer concludes that “[t]he
status of judicial review on the eve of the Federal Convention was . . .
uncertain at best.”12 In order to overcome such uncertainty, Kramer would
require specific evidence that the Founders intended judicial review in
particular contexts. Kramer suggests that such evidence exists to support
judicial review in two circumstances. First, he believes that “the Framers
clearly decided to adopt judicial review as a device for controlling state
laws,”13 but that “[n]o similar decision was made to authorize judicial review
of federal legislation.”14 Second, he maintains that “while the Founders
believed that the provisions delegating powers were not proper subjects for
judicial involvement, many of them thought otherwise when it came to the
rights-bearing provisions.”15 Thus, in Kramer’s view, the Founders expected
courts to review state law and to uphold individual rights, but not to police the
bounds of federal power.
Although there is much to admire in Professor Kramer’s work, there are
at least two difficulties with his proposed dichotomy. First, Kramer’s attempt
to separate judicial review of state law from judicial review of federal statutes
is inconsistent with the text of the Supremacy Clause. The Clause recognizes
only three forms of federal law as “the supreme Law of the Land”—”[t]his
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States.”16 By its terms, therefore, the Clause requires

6 Id. at 49; see also id. (“It was the legislature’s delegated responsibility to decide
whether a proposed law was constitutionally authorized, subject to oversight by the people.
Courts simply had nothing to do with it, and they were acting as interlopers if they tried to
second-guess the legislature’s decision.”).
7 Id. at 27.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 28; see also id. at 31 (stating that “lawyers argued fundamental law to juries,
which rendered verdicts based on their own interpretation and understanding of the
constitution”).
11 Id. at 28.
12 Id. at 59. Kramer acknowledges uncertainty because “a few men reasoned that
respect for popular sovereignty actually required judicial review.” Id. at 51. For these men,
however, judicial review “was not an act of ordinary legal interpretation.” Id. at 54. Rather,
it “was a political—perhaps we should say a ‘political-legal’|act of resistance.” Id. In
Kramer’s view, this meant at most that “laws should be declared void only if
‘unconstitutional beyond dispute.’” Id. at 56.
13 Id. at 61.
14 Id. at 64.
15 Id. at 125; see also Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 287–88 (2000) (suggesting that “[t]he
Framers of the Constitution expected, and may even have hoped, that judges would be
active in reviewing the constitutionality” of federal statutes alleged to violate the Bill of
Rights).
16 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
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courts to prefer federal statutes to contrary state law only if the federal statute
is consistent with “[t]his Constitution.” In other words, courts have no
warrant to enforce unconstitutional federal statutes over contrary state law.
This is true whether the federal statute in question violates the Constitution’s
“provisions delegating powers” or its “rights-bearing provisions.”17 Thus, in
such cases, the Supremacy Clause explicitly conditions judicial review of
state law on judicial review of federal statutes.
Second, Professor Kramer’s further attempt to distinguish judicial review
under “the rights-bearing provisions” of the Constitution from judicial review
under the “provisions delegating powers” contradicts widespread assumptions
at the Founding about the nature and source of individual rights vis-à-vis the
federal government. Federalists and Antifederalists agreed that individual
rights would be secured—at least in part—by the Constitution’s limited
delegation of powers to the federal government. Their disagreement was
whether this feature alone would suffice to protect individual liberty.
The Antifederalists argued that a Bill of Rights was necessary to
guarantee essential rights. The Federalists countered that a Bill of Rights was
both unnecessary and dangerous. It was “unnecessary” because the federal
government lacked power to interfere with the rights at issue. It was
“dangerous” because it might erroneously imply that the federal government
had power to invade other rights retained by the people. The Founders
compromised by including the Ninth and Tenth Amendments in the Bill of
Rights. As discussed below, these amendments negated any suggestion that
the enumeration of rights implied the availability of federal power to invade
other rights, and thus confirm that the Founders equated individual rights with
the limited scope of federal powers. From this perspective, Professor
Kramer’s suggestion that courts enforce “the rights-bearing provisions” of the
Constitution but not the “provisions delegating powers” is anachronistic
because it ignores the common purpose of these provisions and would create
the very danger that the Founders sought to avoid.18
The Founders’ understanding that the Constitution secures individual
rights by limiting federal power has important implications for judicial
review. Professor Kramer’s work profitably reminds us that judicial
supremacy—or, more precisely, judicial exclusivity—is at least in tension
with Founders’ notions of popular sovereignty and popular constitutionalism.
Such tension, however, does not eliminate the need for judicial review of
federal statutes alleged to exceed the scope of federal powers. Such review—
like judicial review of federal statutes under the Bill of Rights—is authorized
by Article III and the Supremacy Clause. Thus, courts cannot simply enforce
the Bill of Rights but decline to police the limits of federal power.19 Given the
Founders’ understanding of the source of individual rights vis-à-vis the
federal government, courts should take a unitary approach to judicial review

17

Kramer, supra note 4, at 125.
For a distinct argument that Professor Kramer’s critique of the Rehnquist Court’s
approach to judicial review “proceeds from an anachronistic understanding of the
foundational principles of Marbury,” see G. Edward White, The Constitutional Journey of
Marbury v. Madison, 89 VA. L. REV. 1463, 1471 (2003).
19 See Kramer, supra note 4, at 122.
18
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under the Supremacy Clause and enforce both the Bill of Rights and the limits
of federal power. Only then could courts uphold all of the rights “retained by
the people.”20
I.

Judicial Review and the Supremacy Clause

Professor Kramer acknowledges that “the Framers clearly decided to
adopt judicial review as a device for controlling state laws,”21 but maintains
that “[n]o similar decision was made to authorize judicial review of federal
legislation.”22 Like Jesse Choper before him, Kramer invokes the Supremacy
Clause in support of this dichotomy.23 In Kramer’s view, “adding the
Supremacy Clause made explicit the authority to do something that might or
might not have been implicit without it.”24 According to Kramer, “An
express command for judges to prefer federal to state law answered the
leading objection to judicial review, which was that judges had not been
authorized by the people to make such decisions.”25
This account overlooks the dual nature of the Supremacy Clause.
Although the Clause requires state courts to follow “the supreme Law of the
Land” over contrary state law,26 the Clause conditions the supremacy of
federal statutes on their being “made in Pursuance” of the Constitution.27
Thus, the Clause constitutes an “express command for judges” not only “to
prefer federal to state law,” but also to prefer the Constitution to federal
statutes.28 This means that, in deciding whether to follow state law or a
contrary federal statute, courts must first resolve any challenges to the
constitutionality of the federal statute at issue. Such review necessarily
includes ascertaining whether the statute falls within the scope of Congress’s
20

U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
Kramer, supra note 4, at 61.
22 Id. at 64. At one point, Kramer merely states that “the power of courts to review
federal legislation was left unaddressed” at the Constitutional Convention. Id. at 67. At
another point, he makes the affirmative argument that “the Founders believed that the
provisions delegating powers [to Congress] were not proper subjects for judicial
involvement.” Id. at 125; see also Kramer, supra note 15, at 235 (stating that “no one in the
Founding generation would have imagined that courts could or should play a prominent role
in defining the limits of federal power”).
23 A quarter century ago, Jesse Choper urged courts to divide judicial review along
similar lines. In Professor Choper’s view, “the constitutional issue whether federal action is
beyond the authority of the central government and thus violates ‘states’ rights’ should be
treated as nonjusticiable, with final resolution left to the political branches.” Jesse H.
Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-à-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial
Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1557 (1977) [hereinafter Choper, Scope of National Power]. At
the same time, he maintained that courts should actively “prevent state encroachment on
national supremacy.” JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 205
(1980) [hereinafter CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW].
24 Kramer, supra note 4, at 63.
25 Id.
26 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
27 Id.
28 This section incorporates arguments made at greater length in Bradford R. Clark,
The Supremacy Clause as a Constraint on Federal Power, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 91
(2003). For related arguments, see Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of
Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 903–13 (2003).
21
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enumerated powers. The text, history and structure of the Constitution
support this conclusion.
A.

Text

The first half of the Supremacy Clause provides that “[t]his Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”29 Significantly, federal
“Laws” qualify as “supreme” under the Clause only if they were “made in
Pursuance” of the Constitution.30 By its terms, therefore, the Supremacy
Clause suggests that courts should prefer federal statutes to contrary state law
only if the federal statutes themselves are constitutional.
The second half of the Supremacy Clause also supports judicial review of
federal statutes. After defining “the supreme Law of the Land,” the Clause
directs that “the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”31 In
so doing, the Clause “impressed state judges into national service, obliging
them not only to subordinate their own state law obligations to federal ones,
but also actively to police state law and void any (even the most fundamental)
if it was inconsistent with any (even the least important) federal law.”32 In
order to comply with this command, however, state judges must identify “the
supreme Law of the Land” with care. Thus, when a party challenges the
constitutionality of a federal statute in state court, state judges must determine
whether the statute was “made in Pursuance” of the Constitution in order to
apply the Supremacy Clause.
If the Constitution authorizes state courts to review the constitutionality
of federal statutes, then it necessarily authorizes the Supreme Court to do so
as well. Article III gives the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over “all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
29

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (“Acts of Congress are the
supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are
declared to be so when made under the authority of the United States.”). Scholars continue
to debate the extent to which the federal government may adopt treaties that either exceed
the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers or otherwise violate the Constitution. See
Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390,
433–50 (1998) (criticizing the “nationalist view” of the treaty power); David M. Golove,
Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of
the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1279–1315 (2000) (defending the “nationalist
view” of the treaty power); Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism,
Part II, 99 MICH. L. REV. 98, 199 (2000) (critiquing Professor Golove’s analysis).
31 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Caleb Nelson has recently examined this portion of the
Supremacy Clause, and concluded that the relevant language constitutes a “non obstante”
clause, a provision used to overcome the traditional rule that “repeals by implication in the
law are not favored.” Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 237–46 (2000). The
result, in his view, is that the “Supremacy Clause requires preemption [of state law] only
when the rules provided by state and federal law contradict each other, so that a court cannot
simultaneously follow both.” Id. at 303.
32 James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and
Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 764
(1998).
30

324

The George Washington Law Review

[Vol. 72:319

United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority.”33 As James Liebman and William Ryan have observed, “the
parallel language of the ‘Arising Under’ and Supremacy Clauses was
intentional and structurally crucial.”34 Even if there were no lower federal
courts with federal question jurisdiction,35 Article III would authorize the
Supreme Court to correct misapplications of the Supremacy Clause by state
courts. Thus, while the Supremacy Clause obligates state judges to ascertain
and enforce “the supreme Law of the Land,” Article III’s decision to vest
appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court “add[s] a yet stronger (because
independent, final, and effectual) external check on state judges—or, more
accurately, a checking up on or spot-checking of state judicial decisions to
assure that state judges are fulfilling their checking function vis-à-vis state
law.”36
If the Supremacy Clause authorizes state courts and the Supreme Court to
review the constitutionality of federal statutes, it is unlikely that the Founders
meant to deny lower federal courts similar authority. These courts trace their
jurisdiction in federal question cases to the same clause in Article III that
authorizes the Supreme Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction in such
cases.37 In addition, as Alexander Hamilton observed, there seems to be “no
impediment to the establishment of an appeal from the state courts, to the
subordinate national tribunals.”38 Rather, such questions appear “to be left to
the discretion of the legislature.”39 Because state courts review the
constitutionality of federal statutes under the Supremacy Clause, lower federal
courts exercising appellate jurisdiction would have to undertake such review
as well. More fundamentally, if one believes—as Professor Kramer does—
that the Supremacy Clause requires lower federal courts to prefer “the
supreme Law of the Land” to contrary state law, then the Clause necessarily
authorizes such courts to determine whether a particular federal statute was in
fact “made in Pursuance” of the Constitution.40
33

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
Liebman & Ryan, supra note 32, at 708.
35 Congress has discretion whether or not “[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the
supreme Court,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9, which implies broad authority to define and
limit their jurisdiction. See, e.g., Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938);
Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 442 (1850). See generally Julian Velasco,
Congressional Control over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Defense of the Traditional View,
46 CATH. U. L. REV. 671 (1997).
36 Liebman & Ryan, supra note 32, at 771–72.
37 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Professor Wechsler reached a similar conclusion. See
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1,
4–5 (1959).
38 THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 495 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
39 Id.
40 The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over appeals from both state and lower federal
courts also supports judicial review by lower federal courts. Through its power to create
lower federal courts and control their jurisdiction, Congress has substantial discretion to
determine whether state or federal courts will adjudicate cases arising under federal law. In
either case, the Supreme Court generally has appellate jurisdiction over such cases. It would
be odd to conclude that the Supreme Court can assess the constitutionality of federal statutes
in cases coming from state courts, but not in cases coming from federal courts. This
suggests that the Supremacy Clause requires federal courts—no less than state courts—to
34
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History

History confirms that the Supremacy Clause authorizes courts to review
the constitutionality of federal statutes in order to identify “the supreme Law
of the Land.” Delegates to the Federal Convention of 1787 widely
acknowledged the need for supremacy with respect to matters properly
assigned to the federal government. At the same time, delegates sought to
prevent the new government from exceeding its enumerated powers at the
expense of the states and the people. To further both goals, the Convention
ultimately adopted the carefully worded Supremacy Clause in preference to
several proposed alternatives. The Founders’ choice confirms that they
expected the judiciary both to enforce the supremacy of federal law and to
uphold the limits of federal power.
1. The Constitutional Convention
The Convention recognized from the outset that some mechanism was
necessary to secure the supremacy of federal law over contrary state law.41
As Jack Rakove has explained, “federalism questions were central to the
origins of judicial review” because federalism “requires mechanisms to
resolve the conflicts that arise when national and state legislation overlap.”42
The Founders considered three mechanisms for resolving such conflicts, each
of which looked to a different branch of government for its implementation.43
First, the Virginia Plan initially proposed authorizing the Union to use
military force to coerce the states to comply with federal law.44 The delegates
were immediately opposed to the use of force.45 At the outset, James
identify and apply “the supreme Law of the Land,” that is, to determine whether an
applicable federal statute was “made in Pursuance” of the Constitution.
41 The proceedings of the Federal Convention of 1787, of course, cannot
authoritatively establish the meaning of the constitutional text. They may, however,
confirm the apparent meaning of the text. The Supremacy Clause, for example, establishes
a rule of decision for courts that restricts “the supreme Law of the Land” to “Laws . . . made
in Pursuance” of “[t]his Constitution.” Notwithstanding this text, Professor Kramer
maintains that the Founders did not intend courts to determine whether federal statutes were
“made in Pursuance” of the Constitution. As discussed in this section, however, the records
of the Convention—particularly its consideration and rejection of the congressional
negative—tend to refute Kramer’s view and confirm the apparent meaning of the text.
42 Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49
STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1042 (1997).
43 For a more detailed discussion of these alternatives, see Bradford R. Clark,
Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1348–55 (2001).
See also JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 171–72 (1996) (“In determining how national acts could be enforced against
potential opposition, the Convention could choose among three mechanisms: the use of
coercive force against defiant states . . . ; the negative on state laws; or the legal prosecution
of individuals who violated or interfered with national law.”).
44 See Notes of James Madison on the Federal Convention (May 29, 1787), in 1 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 17, 21 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
[hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS] (proposing that the National Legislature be authorized “to
call forth the force of the Union agst. any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty
under the articles thereof”).
45 See Notes of James Madison on the Federal Convention (May 31, 1787), in 1
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 44, at 47, 54 (“The use of force agst. a State, would look
more like a declaration of war, than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be
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Madison “observed that the more he reflected on the use of force, the more he
doubted the practicability, the justice and the efficacy of it when applied to
people collectively and not individually. A Union of the States containing
such an ingredient seemed to provide for its own destruction.”46 The
Convention tabled the proposal and never seriously entertained this
alternative.47
Second, the Virginia Plan suggested giving the national legislature power
to negative state laws.48 As originally proposed, this solution would have
empowered Congress “to negative all laws passed by the several States,
contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of [the]
Union.”49 The Convention initially approved the proposal in this form.50 Mr.
Pinckney subsequently moved to expand the negative by proposing “‘that the
National Legislature shd. have authority to negative all Laws which they shd.
judge to be improper.’”51 The proposal of an unlimited congressional
negative provoked strong objections by delegates from small states fearful of
unchecked federal power. These objections proved decisive and the
Convention rejected Pinckney’s proposal to expand the negative.52 The
Convention subsequently reconsidered and rejected even the original
congressional negative.53 Although limited on its face, the negative would
have allowed Congress to determine for itself the scope of its powers vis-à-vis
the states. This result was simply unacceptable to a majority of states at the
Convention.54
considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might
be bound.”).
46 Id. Madison’s views on this question were apparently unsettled until he spoke at
the Convention. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 32, at 710 (stating that private
correspondence suggests that “Madison initially favored authorizing the federal government
to use military force to bring recalcitrant states, and particularly state legislatures, into line
with national law”).
47 The New Jersey Plan subsequently proposed permitting “the federal Executive . . .
to call forth ye power of the Confederated States . . . to enforce and compel an obedience
to . . . Acts [of Congress], or an Observance of . . . Treaties.” Notes of James Madison on
the Federal Convention (June 15, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 44, at 242,
245. The proposal again generated decisive opposition from delegates including Alexander
Hamilton. See Notes of James Madison on the Federal Convention (June 18, 1787), in 1
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 44, at 282, 285 (“But how can this force be exerted on the
States collectively. It is impossible. It amounts to a war between the parties. Foreign
powers also will not be idle spectators. They will interpose, the confusion will increase, and
a dissolution of the Union ensue.”).
48 Notes of James Madison on the Federal Convention (May 31, 1787), in 1
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 44, at 47, 54.
49 Notes of James Madison on the Federal Convention (May 29, 1787), in 1
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 44, at 17, 21.
50 See Notes of James Madison on the Federal Convention (May 31, 1787), in 1
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 44, at 47, 54 (approving the negative and adding “the
words ‘or any Treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union’” to the end of the
clause).
51 Notes of James Madison on the Federal Convention (June 8, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 44, at 164, 164.
52 Id.
53 See Notes of James Madison on the Federal Convention (July 17, 1787), in 2
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 44, at 25, 27–28.
54 Id. at 28 (rejecting “the power of negativing laws of States” by a vote of seven
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Finally, the New Jersey Plan would have required state courts (subject to
federal appellate review) to enforce the Laws of the United States “made by
virtue & in pursuance of the powers hereby . . . vested in them” as “the
supreme law of the respective States.”55 Although this “Supremacy Clause”
was originally rejected as part of the New Jersey Plan, the Convention
subsequently adopted the Clause immediately after rejecting the congressional
negative.56 Significantly, every version of the Supremacy Clause considered
by the Convention tied the supremacy of federal statutes to their fidelity to the
Constitution. For example, the provision initially adopted by the Convention
recognized “the legislative acts of the United States made by virtue and in
pursuance of the articles of Union” as “the supreme law of the respective
States.”57 As finally adopted, the Supremacy Clause designates “the Laws of
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance” of “[t]his Constitution”
as “the supreme Law of the Land.”58 Thus, under all drafts of the Clause
considered at the Convention, courts were required to disregard state law in
favor of contrary federal statutes only if the statutes themselves were
constitutional.59

states to three). On this occasion, Madison reports that “Mr. Govr. Morris was more &
more opposed to the negative. The proposal of it would disgust all the States. A law that
ought to be negatived will be set aside in the Judiciary departmt. and if that security should
fail; may be repealed by a Nationl. law.” Id. at 27–28.
55 Notes of James Madison on the Federal Convention (June 15, 1787), in 1
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 44, at 242, 245. The New Jersey Plan did not authorize
the creation of lower federal courts. Rather, the Plan proposed that all cases arising under
federal law be adjudicated “by the Common Law Judiciarys of the State[s]” in the first
instance. Id. at 243. These decisions would have been subject to appellate review by “a
federal Judiciary . . . to consist of a supreme Tribunal.” Id. at 244.
56 See Journal of the Federal Convention (July 17, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS,
supra note 44, at 21, 22. The Convention subsequently amended the Supremacy Clause to
include the “Constitution” (in addition to “Laws” and “Treaties”), Notes of James Madison
on the Federal Convention (Aug. 23, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 44, at
384, 389, and to make clear that these three sources of federal law were not merely “the
supreme law of the respective States,” but “the supreme Law of the Land,” Report of
Committee of Style, in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 44, at 590, 603.
57 Journal of the Federal Convention (July 17, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra
note 44, at 21, 22.
58 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
59 David Currie relies on the distinct language used by the Clause to describe “Laws”
and “Treaties” to argue that the phrase “Laws . . . made in Pursuance” of “[t]his
Constitution” was solely a temporal reference. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789–1888, at 72–73 (1985). In his view, this
reading “furnishes a powerful argument against judicial review of Acts of Congress.” Id. at
73; see also Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the “Great” Marshall Court Decisions?,
87 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1119 (2001) (“‘In Pursuance thereof’ means ‘after,’ not ‘consistent
with.’”); William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J.
1, 21 (suggesting that the phrase might “mean merely that only those statutes adopted by
Congress after the re-establishment and reconstitution of Congress pursuant to the
Constitution itself shall be the supreme law of the land”). There are several difficulties with
this interpretation. First, the distinctive language with respect to “Treaties” was added after
the language used to describe “Laws.” Thus, it seems unlikely that the phrase adopted to
describe “Laws” was intended to differentiate itself from a phrase yet to be drafted. See
Clark, supra note 28, at 118. Second, even if the distinctive language used to describe
“Laws” was meant to have temporal significance, there is substantial evidence that it was
also meant to condition the supremacy of federal statutes on adherence to the limits of
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The Founders’ adoption of the Supremacy Clause and rejection of the
congressional negative provides strong evidence that they intended courts—
rather than Congress—to determine whether Congress had exceeded the
scope of its enumerated powers. Proponents of the Supremacy Clause
opposed the negative in part because it would have allowed Congress to judge
the scope of its own powers. Assigning this responsibility to judges—
including state judges—would establish both horizontal and vertical checks
against congressional overreaching. The judicial branch would check the
legislative branch and state agents would check the federal government.
Further efforts to revive the congressional negative failed,60 thus leaving
resolution of conflicts between state and federal law to courts.
Recognizing the conditional nature of the Supremacy Clause helps to
explain events at the Convention that Professor Kramer finds puzzling. For
example, Kramer observes that immediately after the defeat of the
congressional negative, “Luther Martin moved to incorporate into the
Constitution the proposed Supremacy Clause from the defeated New Jersey
Plan.”61 According to Kramer,
Martin’s decision to move this amendment after the legislative
veto had already been defeated is curious. If, as Sherman and
Morris had suggested, a legislative veto was unnecessary because
judicial review was already implicit, why move after the veto had
been voted down to add a provision explicitly ordering state
judges to treat federal law as supreme? And why do so if you are
Luther Martin and interested mostly in keeping any limits on state
power as weak as possible?62
Kramer speculates that Martin wanted “to ensure that the legislative veto
was dead once and for all.”63 But even assuming that Martin’s motives for
introducing the Supremacy Clause are relevant to its meaning, Martin’s
motion appears to have been more than a mere defensive maneuver. Martin
sought adoption of the Supremacy Clause because he (like the original
Congress’s enumerated powers. These functions are not mutually exclusive. See id. at 118–
19. Third, the distinct language used to describe “Laws” and “Treaties” may actually
support judicial review of federal statutes. Treaties concern our external relations with
foreign nations, whereas laws generally focus on domestic matters. Although the Founders
assigned nearly complete power over foreign relations to federal officials, they were
unwilling to delegate similarly broad authority over internal affairs to the central
government. Thus, it is not surprising that the Constitution expressly conditions the
supremacy of federal “Laws”—but not “Treaties”—on adherence to the limits of federal
power. See id. at 119.
60 Near the end of the Convention, several delegates attempted to revive a
congressional power “‘[t]o negative all laws passed by the several States interfering in the
opinion of the Legislature with the General interests and the harmony of the Union.’” Notes
of James Madison on the Federal Convention (Aug. 23, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS,
supra note 44, at 384, 390. Although this version of the negative would have required “that
two thirds of the members of each House assent to” its exercise, id., opponents again
objected in strong terms and the Convention rejected the proposal. See id. at 391 (“If
nothing else, this alone would damn and ought to damn the Constitution. Will any State
ever agree to be bound hand & foot in this manner.”).
61 Kramer, supra note 4, at 63.
62 Id.
63 Id.
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proponents of the New Jersey Plan) understood that the Clause would
authorize courts to check federal as well as state power.
Professor Kramer’s mistake lies in reading the Supremacy Clause as a
one-sided provision that always favors the federal government at the expense
of the states. In fact, the Clause was designed to be a double-edged sword—
that is, an authorization for courts to keep both the federal government and the
states within their proper spheres. The Clause requires state courts to prefer
federal statutes to state law, but only if the statutes in question were “made in
Pursuance” of the Constitution.64 For this reason, Martin’s motion was
consistent with his well-known desire to protect the states against unwarranted
federal legislation. He knew that if Congress exceeded its constitutional
powers, the Supremacy Clause would allow state courts to disregard federal
law. In other words, the price of federal supremacy was judicial review.
From this perspective, it is not at all “curious” that Luther Martin—a delegate
committed to keeping “limits on state power as weak as possible”—proposed
the Supremacy Clause.
The conditional nature of the Supremacy Clause also sheds light on other
matters that Professor Kramer finds difficult to explain. In discussing judicial
review, Kramer recounts the Convention’s consideration of a Council of
Revision—a proposal to vest the power to veto federal legislation in the
president and a convenient number of federal judges.65 James Wilson favored
the proposal on the ground that judicial review might prove inadequate to
protect against “encroachments on the people as well as on [the Judiciary].”66
Other delegates opposed the proposal on the ground that it would give judges
too much power in conjunction with judicial review. For example, Luther
Martin objected that because “the Constitutionality of laws . . . will come
before the Judges in their proper official character,” putting judges on the
Council of Revision would give them “a double negative.”67 Finally, George
Mason favored a Council of Revision because judicial review could eliminate
some—but not all—of the “unjust and pernicious laws” that Congress might
enact.68
According to Mason, federal judges “could declare an
unconstitutional law void,” but should give “a free course” to “every law
however unjust oppressive or pernicious, which did not come plainly under
this description.”69
Professor Kramer finds it “difficult to know what to make of this
exchange.”70 He acknowledges that Wilson envisioned at least limited
judicial review, and that Martin and Mason “seemed to assume a broader
power.”71 Because the Council of Revision was rejected and “no other
motion was made pertaining to the role of judges,” Kramer concludes that

64

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
See Kramer, supra note 4, at 64–66.
66 Notes of James Madison on the Federal Convention (July 21, 1787), in 2
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 44, at 73, 73.
67 Id. at 76.
68 Id. at 78.
69 Id.
70 Kramer, supra note 4, at 66.
71 Id.
65
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“we are left uncertain as to what role, if any, judicial review was expected to
play.”72 Kramer offers several possible explanations “why none of the
advocates of judicial review thought to make a motion to add this power.”73
He hypothesizes that these delegates either “did not think it important to
incorporate the power into the Constitution,” or they “believed any effort to
add such a provision would fail.”74 Kramer concludes that “[w]hatever the
explanation, the power of courts to review federal legislation was left
unaddressed.”75
Here again, Professor Kramer overlooks the dual role of the Supremacy
Clause. Luther Martin had no reason to propose judicial review of federal
statutes following rejection of the Council of Revision for the simple reason
that he had already proposed—and the Convention had already approved—
the Supremacy Clause. Having successfully urged the adoption of the Clause
just four days earlier, Martin had every reason to expect that courts would
exercise judicial review in the course of identifying “the supreme Law of the
Land.” That is why, in opposing the Council of Revision, Martin confidently
declared that “the Constitutionality of laws . . . will come before the Judges in
their proper official character.”76 At that point in the Convention, another
motion pertaining to judicial review would have been superfluous.
2. The Ratification Debates
The ratification debates confirm that the Supremacy Clause tied judicial
review of state law to judicial review of federal statutes.77 Opponents of the
Constitution argued that the Clause would enable the federal government to
exercise unlimited power at the expense of the states.78 Proponents of the
Constitution responded by stressing the conditional nature of federal
supremacy.79
In Massachusetts, for example, Cassius defended the
Supremacy Clause, “which knaves and blockheads have so often dressed up
in false colours.”80 After quoting the Clause in full, he explained how the
Clause would actually constrain the federal government:

72

Id.
Id.
74 Id. at 67.
75 Id.
76 Notes of James Madison on the Federal Convention (July 21, 1787), in 2
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 44, at 73, 76.
77 This Article examines the ratification debates not because the views expressed
therein are necessarily authoritative as to the meaning of the Constitution, but because (like
The Federalist) they have “significant interpretive value as a detailed, contemporaneous
exposition of the Constitution by authors who were intimately familiar with its legal and
political background.” John F. Manning, Textualism and the Role of The Federalist in
Constitutional Adjudication, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1337, 1339 (1998).
78 See RAKOVE, supra note 43, at 183–88
79 See generally Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of
Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1507–21 (2001) (discussing the
ratification debates and the expectations regarding judicial review).
80 Cassius VI, To the Inhabitants of This State, MASS. GAZETTE, Dec. 25, 1787,
reprinted in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
511, 513 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1998) [hereinafter 5
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
73
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This is the article which they say is so arbitrary and tyrannical,
that unless you have a bill of rights to secure you, you are ruined
forever. But in the name of common sense I would ask, . . . would
it not be much easier to resort to the federal constitution, to see if
therein power is given to Congress to make the law in question. If
such power is not given, the law is in fact a nullity, and the people
will not be bound thereby. For let it be remembered, that such
laws, and such only, as are founded on this constitution, are to be
the supreme law of the land . . . .81
George Nicholas, of Virginia, gave similar assurances regarding the dual
nature of the Supremacy Clause. He stressed that the Clause does not “in any
manner give them this unlimited power, because this [Clause] only declares
those laws binding which are made in pursuance of or in conformity to the
particular powers given by the constitution.”82
Similarly, in The Federalist No. 33, Alexander Hamilton defended the
Supremacy Clause by emphasizing its limits:
If a number of political societies enter into a larger political
society, the laws which the latter may enact, pursuant to the
powers intrusted to it by its constitution, must necessarily be
supreme over those societies and the individuals of whom they are
composed. . . . But it will not follow from this doctrine that acts of
the larger society which are not pursuant to its constitutional
powers, but which are invasions of the residuary authorities of the
smaller societies, will become the supreme law of the land. These
will be merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be treated as
such.83
Although Hamilton thought that such a limitation on federal supremacy
would have been implicit in any event, he stressed that the Supremacy Clause
“expressly confines this supremacy to laws made pursuant to the
Constitution.”84

81

Id.
Letter from George Nicholas (Feb. 16, 1788), in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 369, 369 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino
eds., 1988).
83 THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 204 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961);
see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, at 177 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(noting “that the laws of the Confederacy, as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of its
jurisdiction, will become the SUPREME LAW of the land”).
84 THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, supra note 83, at 205. Professor Kramer might argue that
these statements merely restate the limits of federal supremacy set forth in the Supremacy
Clause, without addressing whether courts should enforce such limits. This reading is
unpersuasive for several reasons. First, by its terms, the Supremacy Clause is a rule of
decision for courts. Kramer himself argues that the Clause authorizes courts to review state
law alleged to conflict with federal statutes. If the Clause authorizes judicial review in these
circumstances, then—by its terms—it also authorizes judicial review of the federal statutes
at issue. Second, as discussed, the Founders understood the Supremacy Clause as an
alternative to the congressional negative. Whereas the latter would have allowed Congress
to judge the scope of its own powers vis-à-vis the states, a principal purpose of the former
was to reassign this task to courts. Finally, taken in context, the statements quoted in the
text appear to contemplate judicial review.
82
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Structure

The constitutional structure also supports judicial review of the scope of
federal powers. As discussed, the Founders selected the Supremacy Clause
over the congressional negative largely because the small states refused to
permit Congress to be the judge of its own powers.85 Unlike the negative, the
Supremacy Clause assigned resolution of federal-state conflicts to courts
rather than Congress. By enlisting courts, the Founders established multiple
checks against the abuse of federal power. Although the Founders gave states
an important role in the composition and selection of the federal government
(including Congress),86 they were not content to rely exclusively on these
“political safeguards of federalism” to prevent federal overreaching. To be
sure, these mechanisms provided some assurance to the states, but not enough
for them to adopt the congressional negative and thereby allow Congress to
judge the scope of its own powers vis-à-vis the states and the people.87 In this
For example, Cassius argued that if the Constitution does not give power “to Congress to
make the law in question,” then “the law is in fact a nullity, and the people will not be bound
thereby.” Cassius VI, supra note 80, at 513. His reference to “the people,” of course,
supports Professor Kramer’s conclusion that the Founders expected popular enforcement of
the Constitution. But this recognition by no means forecloses judicial review as an
additional safeguard. Indeed, Cassius made his observation in the course of contrasting the
Supremacy Clause with a bill of rights as a means of restraining unwarranted federal
legislation. Cassius argued that a bill of rights was unnecessary because it would be easier
to prevent Congress from exceeding its powers under the Supremacy Clause. To the extent
that Cassius expected courts to enforce a bill of rights, he presumably expected them to
enforce the Supremacy Clause as well.
Similarly, Alexander Hamilton argued that acts of Congress “which are not pursuant to its
constitutional powers” will not “become the supreme law of the land.” THE FEDERALIST NO.
33, supra note 83, at 204. “These will be merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be
treated as such.” Id. Again, Hamilton might have contemplated popular resistance to such
laws, but he undoubtedly contemplated judicial review as well. See THE FEDERALIST NO.
78, at 467–71 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Specifically, Hamilton
made his remarks about the Supremacy Clause in the context of discussing a hypothetical
federal statute “abrogating or preventing the collection of a tax laid by the authority of the
State (unless upon imports and exports).” THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, supra note 83, at 205.
Such a statute, he stressed, would not be the supreme law of the land, “but a usurpation of
power not granted by the Constitution.” Id. Thus, he concluded “that the individual States
would, under the proposed Constitution, retain an independent and uncontrollable authority
to raise revenue to any extent of which they may stand in need, by every kind of taxation,
except duties on imports and exports.” Id. These remarks necessarily imply that courts
were neither bound nor authorized to enforce an unconstitutional federal statute over
contrary state revenue laws.
85 As initially approved, the negative would have empowered Congress “to negative
all laws passed by the several States, contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature
the articles of the Union.” Notes of James Madison on the Federal Convention (May 29,
1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 44, at 17, 21 (emphasis added). By leaving
this determination to Congress, the negative would have effectively vested Congress with
absolute discretion to suspend state law. See Prakash & Yoo, supra note 79, at 1503 (stating
that “in the absence of judicial review of federal laws, Congress would, in effect, have the
unchecked power to veto state legislation”).
86 See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
543, 543–44, 546–47 (1954); see also Clark, supra note 43, at 1328–72 (explaining how
federal lawmaking procedures incorporate the political safeguards of federalism and
preserve the governance prerogatives of the states).
87 See supra notes 48–54 and accompanying text; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at
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sense, the Founders’ decision to adopt the Supremacy Clause instead of the
negative followed the well-known maxim that no one should be the judge in
his own cause.88 Moreover, by assigning resolution of conflicts between state
and federal law to courts, the Founders established an additional and distinct
check against abuse of federal powers.
Both state and federal courts enjoy significant independence from
Congress. State courts are creatures of state law and are thus generally
insulated from congressional coercion or control. Similarly, by design,
federal judges enjoy substantial independence from the political branches by
virtue of constitutionally-mandated life tenure and salary protection.89 The
structural independence of the judiciary works in tandem with the Supremacy
Clause to keep the federal government within its proper sphere. James
Wilson stressed this point during the ratification debates:
If a law should be made inconsistent with those powers vested by
this instrument in Congress, the judges, as a consequence of their
independence, and the particular powers of government being
defined, will declare such law to be null and void. For the power
of the Constitution predominates. Anything, therefore, that shall
be enacted by Congress contrary thereto will not have the force of
law.90
Professor Kramer’s position that the Founders authorized judicial review
of state but not federal law not only contradicts the text of the Supremacy
Clause, but also undercuts this important structural check. Thus, Kramer’s
approach would effectively negate the Founders’ decision to adopt the
Supremacy Clause in lieu of the congressional negative.
467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“If it be said that the legislative
body are themselves the constitutional judges of their own powers and that the construction
they put upon them is conclusive upon the other departments it may be answered that this
cannot be the natural presumption where it is not to be collected from any particular
provisions in the Constitution.”).
88 See Philip A. Hamburger, Revolution and Judicial Review: Chief Justice Holt’s
Opinion in City of London v. Wood, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2091 (1994) (linking the maxim
that a person should not be the judge in his own cause to judicial review in early eighteenth
century England); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 646 (1996) (explaining
that the constitutional “separation of lawmaking from law-exposition promoted the rule of
law and controlled arbitrary government”); Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the
Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over
Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1283 (2002) (“Believing that no one ought
to be ‘judge in his own cause,’ the Founders established three separate branches of
government and positioned the judiciary to keep the political branches within the bounds of
their lawful authority.”); Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and the
Idea of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 305 (1989) (stating that “the notion that
no man can be a judge in his own cause was among the earliest expressions of the rule of
law in Anglo-American jurisprudence”); cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 478 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (defending federal jurisdiction over disputes between
two states on the ground that “[n]o man ought certainly to be a judge in his own cause, or in
any cause in respect to which he has the least interest or bias”).
89 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
90 Debates of the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 7, 1787), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 512, 517 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976)
[hereinafter 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
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Judicial Review and Individual Rights

Again following Jesse Choper’s example, Professor Kramer would
recognize a second exception to “popular constitutionalism” in favor of
judicial review to “enforc[e] individual rights.”91 Kramer finds support for
this exception in the Founders’ understanding of the Constitution’s specific
provisions designed to protect individual rights. In his view, “while the
Founders believed that the provisions delegating powers were not proper
subjects for judicial involvement, many of them thought otherwise when it
came to the rights-bearing provisions.”92 After discussing the views of
Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and St. George Tucker, Kramer concludes
that “[j]udicial protection of individual rights was thus established early as a
hallmark of American jurisprudence.”93
There are several difficulties with attempts to distinguish judicial review
of federal statutes that threaten individual rights from judicial review of
federal statutes that exceed the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers.
First, such attempts are inconsistent with the relevant constitutional text. The
primary textual basis for judicial review of any federal statute is the
Supremacy Clause, which recognizes “the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance” of “[t]his Constitution” as “the supreme Law of
the Land.”94 If this language authorizes courts to review the constitutionality
of federal statutes that violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, for example, then it
also allows courts to review federal statutes that exceed the scope of
Congress’s enumerated powers. Thus, the text of the Supremacy Clause itself
appears to foreclose modern attempts to divide judicial review according to
the source of the constitutional defect alleged.
Second, the dichotomy proposed by Professors Choper and Kramer
contradicts key assumptions held by the Founders about the nature and source
of individual rights at the Founding. Those who framed and ratified the
Constitution generally equated individual liberty with limited federal power.
As Philip Hamburger has explained, the Founders “assumed that by
enumerating federal powers, the people would remain free from the federal
government in other respects and thereby would retain innumerably many

91 Kramer, supra note 4, at 125; see Choper, Scope of National Power, supra note 23,
at 1577 (arguing that dispensing with judicial review of the scope of federal powers “would
husband the Supreme Court’s scarce political capital, and thus would enhance the Justices’
ability to act in support of personal liberties”).
92 Kramer, supra note 4, at 125; see also id. at 124 (stating that while many Founders
favored judicial review of the Constitution’s rights-bearing provisions, “all but a very few
believed [that the provisions delegating powers] were too indefinite and too political to
afford a proper subject for intensive judicial scrutiny”); Kramer, supra note 15, at 287–88
(suggesting that “[t]he Framers of the Constitution expected, and may even have hoped, that
judges would be active in reviewing the constitutionality” of federal statutes alleged to
violate the Bill of Rights).
93 Kramer, supra note 4, at 125; see also id. at 78 n.303 (discussing Madison’s
“reasoning behind his introduction of a Bill of Rights” and his embrace of judicial review).
Here again, Professor Kramer follows in the footsteps of Jesse Choper. Professor Choper
urged courts to abandon judicial review of the scope of federal powers in order to “husband
the Supreme Court’s scarce political capital, and thus . . . enhance the Justices’ ability to act
in support of personal liberties.” Choper, Scope of National Power, supra note 23, at 1577.
94 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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rights.”95 Conversely, the Founders believed that the only rights they
surrendered to the federal government were those encompassed by the powers
enumerated in the new Constitution. Given this understanding, courts cannot
protect individual liberty—as understood by the Founders—without enforcing
both the rights-bearing and power-conferring provisions of the Constitution.
From the Founders’ perspective, judicial review under both sets of provisions
would have been equally necessary to preserve individual rights vis-à-vis the
federal government.
Third, the Bill of Rights itself refutes attempts to bifurcate judicial
review. The Ninth and Tenth Amendments reflect and reinforce the
Founders’ understanding that limited federal power preserves individual
liberty. Accordingly, if courts have authority to enforce individual rights
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, then they necessarily have authority to
invalidate statutes that exceed Congress’s enumerated powers and thereby
violate other rights “retained by the people.”96 These considerations suggest
that Professor Kramer should abandon efforts to divide judicial review and
embrace unitary judicial review under the Supremacy Clause to uphold the
Constitution in its entirety.
A.

The Textual Basis for Judicial Review

Professor Kramer’s proposed distinction—between judicial review of
federal statutes that threaten individual rights and judicial review of federal
statutes that exceed the scope of federal powers—lacks a clear basis in the
constitutional text. In fact, the text of the Supremacy Clause appears to
foreclose any such distinction. As discussed in Part I, Kramer believes that
the Supremacy Clause authorizes judicial review of state law,97 but that “the
power of courts to review federal legislation was left unaddressed.”98 At the
same time, he maintains that the “Framers of the Constitution expected, and
may even have hoped, that judges would be active in reviewing the
constitutionality of” federal statutes alleged to violate the Bill of Rights.99
Kramer does not identify any particular provision of the constitutional text as
authority for such review. Without such a provision, one would expect
Kramer to conclude that “respect for popular sovereignty demanded that
judges enforce properly enacted laws and leave constitutional questions to be
settled elsewhere.”100
Professor Kramer might invoke the Supremacy Clause as a textual basis

95

Philip A. Hamburger, Trivial Rights, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 3 (1994). In other
words, the Founders assumed what the Bill of Rights later made explicit—that is, the
“powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,” U.S. CONST. amend. X,
would leave undisturbed other rights “retained by the people,” U.S. CONST. amend. IX. See
infra notes 147–176 and accompanying text.
96 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
97 Kramer, supra note 4, at 61 (discussing the Supremacy Clause and stating that “the
Framers clearly decided to adopt judicial review as a device for controlling state laws”);
Kramer, supra note 15, at 243 (“The inclusion of the Supremacy Clause indicates that the
Framers believed courts could play a role in enforcing the Constitution against the states.”).
98 Kramer, supra note 4, at 67.
99 Kramer, supra note 15, at 287–88.
100 Kramer, supra note 4, at 48.
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for judicial review of federal statutes alleged to violate the Bill of Rights. The
Clause confers supremacy on “the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance” of “[t]his Constitution.”101 According to Article V,
constitutional amendments ratified in accordance with the procedures set forth
therein “shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this
Constitution.”102 Federal statutes that violate the Bill of Rights, therefore, are
not “made in Pursuance” of “[t]his Constitution” within the meaning of the
Supremacy Clause. Thus, such statutes do not qualify as “the supreme Law
of the Land,” and courts are not “bound thereby.”103
Once one identifies the Supremacy Clause as the basis for judicial review
of federal statutes alleged to violate the Bill of Rights, however, there is no
textual support for rejecting judicial review of statutes alleged to exceed
Congress’s enumerated powers. The Clause requires courts to determine
whether federal statutes were “made in Pursuance” of “[t]his Constitution.”104
“This Constitution” encompasses both the original Constitution and
subsequent amendments adopted under Article V. Thus, a federal statute that
violates either portion of the Constitution fails to qualify as “the supreme Law
of the Land.” In short, if—as Professor Kramer appears to assume—the
Supremacy Clause authorizes judicial review of federal statutes that violate
the Bill of Rights, then the Clause a fortiori authorizes judicial review of
statutes that exceed the limits of federal power under the original Constitution.
The only potential way to avoid this conclusion would be to demonstrate
that the Founders understood the Supremacy Clause’s reference to “[t]his
Constitution” to encompass “the rights-bearing provisions” of the
Constitution105 but not “the provisions delegating powers.”106 Even if one
accepts Professor Kramer’s premise that a clear constitutional text can be
overridden by the ratifiers’ contrary expectations, he has not even attempted
such a demonstration. Nor is one possible. As the next section explains, the
Founders understood the rights-bearing and powers-conferring provisions of
the Constitution to be mutually reinforcing means of accomplishing the same
ends—limiting federal powers and preserving individual rights.107 Thus, if
they anticipated judicial review with respect to either set of provisions, they
almost certainly expected judicial review with respect to the other.
B.

Linking Individual Rights to the Scope of Federal Powers

Professor Kramer maintains that the Founders had “disparate
expectations for what courts should do when it came to different sorts of

101

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
U.S. CONST. art. V (emphasis added).
103 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
104 Id.
105 Kramer, supra note 4, at 125.
106 Id.
107 Professor Kramer might look to Article III, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, or the
Oath Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3, as an alternative textual basis for judicial review to
enforce the rights-bearing provisions of the Constitution. Like the Supremacy Clause,
however, these provisions are worded generally and thus appear to support judicial review
of all federal statutes alleged to violate the Constitution or none at all.
102
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questions.”108 In his view, “the scope of judicial review in areas like . . .
individual rights may have little relevance when it comes to assessing the
Court’s practice in the historically distinct domain of federalism.”109
Kramer’s attempt to separate individual rights from questions regarding the
scope of federal power, however, is historically inaccurate and ultimately
unpersuasive. There is substantial evidence arising from the debate over a
Bill of Rights that the Founders understood individual rights vis-à-vis the
federal government to depend in large measure on the limited nature of
federal power. Given this understanding, it is anachronistic to distinguish
sharply between judicial review under the Bill of Rights and judicial review of
the scope of federal powers.
1. Disputing the Necessity of a Bill of Rights
The Founders paid relatively little attention to the enumeration of
individual rights as such at the Constitutional Convention, focusing instead
almost exclusively on the structure of the new federal government and the
scope of its powers. As originally adopted, the Constitution specified only a
handful of rights against the federal government, such as the prohibitions
against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws,110 and the right to a jury trial
in criminal cases.111 Late in the Convention, Charles Pinckney submitted a
list of proposals to be referred to the Committee of Detail, including
provisions that would have guaranteed several now familiar rights.112
Pinckney proposed preserving the “liberty of the Press” and preventing the
involuntary quartering of troops in time of peace.113 These proposals were
referred to the Committee of Detail “without debate or consideration,”114 but
failed to emerge from the Committee.
A few weeks later, George Mason stated that he “wished the plan had
been prefaced with a Bill of Rights,” and suggested that “with the aid of the
State declarations, a bill might be prepared in a few hours.”115 Elbridge Gerry
“moved for a Committee to prepare a Bill of Rights,” but the motion was
defeated unanimously without substantial discussion.116 Finally, Pinckney
and Gerry made a more modest motion “to insert a declaration ‘that the liberty
of the Press should be inviolably observed.’”117 Roger Sherman argued that
108

Kramer, supra note 15, at 288.
Id.
110 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
111 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
112 Notes of James Madison on the Federal Convention (Aug. 20, 1787), in 2
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 44, at 340, 340–42.
113 Id. at 341.
114 Id. at 342.
115 Notes of James Madison on the Federal Convention (Sept. 12, 1787), in 2
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 44, at 585, 587–88.
116 Id. at 588. Arthur Wilmarth observes that their motion was defeated “either
because most of the delegates were too exhausted to consider a new subject or, more likely,
because they genuinely believed that the rights of state citizens would not be threatened by
the Constitution.” Arthur E. Wilmarth, The Original Purpose of the Bill of Rights: James
Madison and the Founders’ Search for a Workable Balance Between Federal and State
Power, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261, 1275 (1989).
117 Notes of James Madison on the Federal Convention (Sept. 14, 1787), in 2
109
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the declaration was “unnecessary” because the “power of Congress does not
extend to the Press.”118 The Convention apparently agreed and rejected the
motion by a vote of seven states to four.119
Interest in adding a Bill of Rights, of course, did not end with the
Convention. As Arthur Wilmarth has explained, the absence of such
guarantees became a rallying cry for Antifederalists opposed to ratification.120
The Federalists’ response was twofold. They argued that a Bill of Rights was
both “unnecessary” and “dangerous.”121 A Bill of Rights was unnecessary
because the Constitution gives the federal government only enumerated, and
therefore limited, powers. As Hamilton put it, “why declare that things shall
not be done which there is no power to do?”122 As discussed further below,
Federalists also argued that a Bill of Rights was dangerous because it might
suggest, contrary to the doctrine of enumerated federal powers, that Congress
otherwise had implied power under the original Constitution to invade the
rights singled out for protection.123 These objections were repeated
throughout the ratification debates.
The Federalists’ first argument was that the Constitution’s enumeration
of powers effectively constrained the federal government’s ability to invade
the rights that concerned Antifederalists.124 In discussing the necessity of a
Bill of Rights, many speakers focused on the liberty of the press. Alexander
Hamilton inquired, “Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the
press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions
may be imposed?”125 Echoing the language of the Supremacy Clause, James
Wilson made a similar point in Pennsylvania:
In answer to the gentleman from Fayette (John Smilie) on the
subject of the press, I beg leave to make an observation; it is very
true, sir, that this Constitution says nothing with regard to that
subject, nor was it necessary, because it will be found that there is
given to the general government no power whatsoever concerning
it; and no law in pursuance of the Constitution can possibly be
enacted to destroy that liberty.126
Also in Pennsylvania, “One of the People” wrote, “Their power is
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 44, at 612, 617.
118 Id. at 618.
119 Id.
120 See Wilmarth, supra note 116, at 1281.
121 THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
122 Id.
123 See Thomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1215, 1226 (1990) (“A bill of rights would reverse the Constitution’s
premise that all not granted was reserved; instead, the government would hold all power
except what was prohibited in the bill of rights.”).
124 See Hamburger, supra note 95, at 21; see also Wilmarth, supra note 116, at 1274
(noting that “the Federalists argued during the ratification debates that a federal bill of rights
was unnecessary, because the sovereign people had delegated to the federal government
only ‘enumerated powers’ that could not be used to infringe upon the people’s rights”).
125 THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 513–14 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
126 Debates of the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 1, 1787), in 2 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 90, at 444, 454–55.
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defined and limited by the 8th section of the first Article of the Constitution,
and they have not power to take away the freedom of the press . . . .”127
Edmund Randolph reiterated these views in Virginia: “Go through these
powers, examine every one and tell me if the most exalted genius can prove
that the liberty of the press is in danger.”128 One of the “Middling-Interest”
made the same point in Massachusetts: “The opposers of the new government
have branched out the evils arising from the pretended want of a declaration
of rights into several particulars—one of which is, that the LIBERTY OF
THE PRESS is not provided for—But the real question is, where is it taken
away?”129 And, in Connecticut, Roger Sherman observed, “The liberty of the
Press can be in no danger, because that is not put under the direction of the
new government.”130
In these discussions, leading Federalists used the liberty of the press
simply as one example to make their larger point that “[l]iberty is secured . . .
by the limitation of [federal] powers.”131 For instance, after contrasting the
powers of the states with those of the federal government, James Wilson
explained that a Bill of Rights was necessary to restrain the former but not the
latter because the federal government was one of enumerated powers:
When the people established the powers of legislation under their
separate governments, they invested their representatives with
every right and authority which they did not in explicit terms
reserve . . . . But in delegating federal powers, another criterion
was necessarily introduced, and the congressional authority is to
be collected, not from tacit implication, but from the positive grant
expressed in the instrument of union. Hence it is evident, that in
the former case everything which is not reserved is given, but in
the latter the reverse of the proposition prevails, and everything
which is not given, is reserved. This distinction being recognized,
will furnish an answer to those who think the omission of a bill of
rights, a defect in the proposed Constitution: for it would have
been superfluous and absurd to have stipulated with a federal body
of our own creation, that we should enjoy those privileges, of
127 One of the People, PENN. GAZETTE, Oct. 17, 1787, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 90, at 186, 190.
128 Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 10, 1788), in 9 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1092, 1099–1100 (John P. Kaminski &
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990) [hereinafter 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
129 One of the Middling-Interest, MASS. CENTINEL, Nov. 28, 1787, reprinted in 4 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 328, 331 (John P.
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1997) [hereinafter 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]; see
also id. (reiterating that Congress “can never restrict the liberty of the press, unless they
have some power given them by the constitution so to do, which no where appears”).
130 Roger Sherman, A Citizen of New Haven: Observations on the New Federal
Constitution, CONN. COURANT, Jan. 7, 1788, reprinted in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 280, 282 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J.
Saladino eds., 1984).
131 Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 7, 1788), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 128, at 1006, 1012; see Hamburger, supra note 95, at 25 (“In other words,
publishing, like eating and drinking, was a freedom unaffected by the Constitution, because
nothing was said in the enumeration of powers that would permit the federal government to
legislate on the subject.”).
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which we are not divested either by the intention or the act, that
has brought that body into existence.132
Thomas Hartley of Pennsylvania also equated individual rights with the
absence of federal power:
As soon as the independence of America was declared in the year
1776, from that instant all our natural rights were restored to us,
and we were at liberty to adopt any form of government to which
our views or our interests might incline us. This truth, expressly
recognized by the act, declaring our independence, naturally
produced another maxim, that whatever portion of those natural
rights we did not transfer to the government was still reserved and
retained by the people; for, if no power was delegated to the
government, no right was resigned by the people; and if a part
only of our national rights was delegated, is it not absurd to assert
that we have relinquished the whole? Where then is the necessity
of a formal declaration that those rights are still retained, of the
resignation of which no evidence can possibly be produced?133
Edmund Pendleton made the same point in rejecting the need for
amendments to establish the right to “trial by Jury” and “the Liberty of the
Press”: “[I]s it not Safer to trust the two first rights to the Broad & Sure
ground of this Principle—that the people being Established in the Grant itself
as the Fountain of Power, retain every thing which is not granted?”134
In sum, Federalists generally regarded individual rights and limited
federal power as essentially synonymous.135 As a Massachusetts newspaper
put it: “So, as the people now possess all the rights and all the power of
freemen, what can the Congress have to do with those rights which they keep
at home—which they do not throw into the common stock—over which they
do not expressly give Congress any power?”136 Hugh Williamson expressed
the same understanding in North Carolina: “It is granted, and perfectly
understood, that under the Government of the Assemblies of the States, and
under the Government of the Congress, every right is reserved to the
individual, which he has not expressly delegated to this, or that
Legislature.”137 Another commentator put the point more colorfully in

132 James Wilson, Speech in the State House Yard (Oct. 6, 1787), reprinted in 2
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 90, at 167, 167–68.
133 Debates of the Pennsylvania Convention (Nov. 30, 1787), in 2 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 90, at 424, 430.
134 Letter from Edmund Pendleton to Richard Henry Lee (June 14, 1788), in 18 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 178, 179–80 (John P.
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1995).
135 See Hamburger, supra note 95, at 3 (explaining that the framers of the Constitution
“assumed that by enumerating federal powers, the people would remain free from the
federal government in other respects and thereby would retain innumerably many rights”);
see also McAffee, supra note 123, at 1226 (stating that “in this context, ‘rights’ and
‘powers’ are two sides of the same coin”).
136 SALEM MERCURY, Jan. 8, 1788, reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
80, at 652, 652.
137 Hugh Williamson, Speech at Edenton, N.C. (Nov. 8, 1787), in N.Y. DAILY
ADVERTISER, Feb. 25–27, 1788, reprinted in 16 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
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Massachusetts: “The first section in the federal form will help our eye-sight, if
we are not determined to be blind, to see that we retain all our rights, which
we have not expressly relinquished to the union.”138
Thus, there was widespread recognition among the Founders that
individual rights vis-à-vis the federal government would be protected, at least
in part, by the limited delegation of power to Congress under the new
Constitution. Such recognition essentially forecloses any suggestion that
courts could employ judicial review to protect individual rights but not to
police the bounds of federal power. If the Founders hoped courts would
protect individual rights under the new Constitution, then they necessarily
hoped courts would keep Congress from invading such rights by exceeding
the scope of its enumerated powers.
2. The Danger That a Bill of Rights Could Expand Federal Power
Many Founders feared that a Bill of Rights was not only unnecessary, but
also dangerous to the rights of the people.139 This fear rested on the
widespread assumption that individual rights were secured by the limited
nature of Congress’s powers. During the ratification period, many believed
that a Bill of Rights—although intended to secure individual rights—would
actually undermine such rights by unintentionally enlarging the scope of
federal power by implication. Specifically, a Bill of Rights might have
wrongly suggested that Congress had power under the original Constitution to
violate the rights secured. Because it was impossible to specify all of the
rights held against the federal government, a Bill of Rights might erroneously
imply that Congress had power over other rights not specified and thus leave
unenumerated rights less secure.140 As Alexander Hamilton warned, a Bill of
Rights “would contain various exceptions to powers which are not granted;
and on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than
were granted.”141
Numerous participants in state ratifying conventions agreed that a Bill of
Rights “would be not only unnecessary, but preposterous and dangerous.”142
Equating individual rights with reserved powers, James Wilson explained this
danger in the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention:
A bill of rights annexed to a constitution is an enumeration of the

RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 201, 202 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino
eds., 1986).
138 One of the Middling-Interest, MASS. CENTINEL, Nov. 28, 1787, reprinted in 4
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 129, at 328, 330.
139 See Wilmarth, supra note 116, at 1285.
140 See Hamburger, supra note 95, at 5; see also James Iredell, Statement at the North
Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 28, 1788), reprinted in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED
BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 144, 149 (photo. reprint 1996)
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS] (“No man, let his ingenuity be what it will, could enumerate all the
individual rights not relinquished by this Constitution.”).
141 THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 481 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
142 Debates of the Pennsylvania Convention (Nov. 28, 1787), in 2 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 90, at 382, 387–89.
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powers reserved. If we attempt an enumeration, everything that is
not enumerated is presumed to be given. The consequence is, that
an imperfect enumeration would throw all implied power into the
scale of the government; and the rights of the people would be
rendered incomplete.143
This danger was widely cited in opposition to a Bill of Rights. Samuel
Holden Parsons, of Connecticut, wrote, “Every power not granted rests where
all power was before lodged—and establishing any other bill of rights would
be dangerous, as it would at least imply that nothing more was left with the
people than the rights defined and secured in such bill of rights.”144
Similarly, Silas Lee, of Massachusetts, thought that a Bill of Rights could
make the Constitution “far more dangerous” because “instead of lessening the
powers of Congress, such a Bill would actually enlarge them—for instead of
the Constitution’s being the limits or boundary line of Congress, the Bill of
Rights only would be the sacred barrier, or mark not to be exceeded.”145
James Madison also recognized the danger posed by a Bill of Rights, given
his understanding that individual rights rested primarily on limited federal
power. He asked rhetorically in the Virginia Ratifying Convention, “Can the
General Government exercise any power not delegated? If an enumeration be
made of our rights, will it not be implied, that every thing omitted, is given to
the General Government?”146
C.

Perfecting the Bill of Rights: The Ninth and Tenth Amendments

The Founders ultimately responded to this danger by including the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments in the Bill of Rights. These amendments represent
formal recognition in the constitutional text that individual rights vis-à-vis the
federal government rest not only on the rights-bearing provisions of the
Constitution, but also on the limited scope of enumerated powers.147
Although modern commentators have sought to expand the role of the Ninth
Amendment to encompass unwritten or natural rights,148 it is difficult to deny
143

Id.
Letter from Samuel Holden Parsons to William Cushing (Jan. 11, 1788), in 3 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 569, 569 (Merrill
Jensen ed., 1978) [hereinafter 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
145 Letter from Silas Lee to George Thatcher (Jan. 23, 1788), in 5 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 80, at 780, 781.
146 Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 24, 1788), in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1473, 1501–02 (John P. Kaminski &
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993); see also Cassius II, To Richard Henry Lee, Esquire, VA.
INDEP. CHRON., Apr. 9, 1788, reprinted in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 128, at
713, 715 (“But, as Congress can exercise no power, except such as are expressly given to
them by the people, a bill of rights is, not only, unnecessary, but, would be, highly
dangerous. Because, if an enumeration was made, it might, then be supposed, that every
right was given up, but what was reserved.”).
147 See generally McAffee, supra note 123; Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1980).
148 See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’
CONSTITUTION 367–83 (1988); CALVIN R. MASSEY, SILENT RIGHTS: THE NINTH AMENDMENT
AND THE CONSTITUTION’S UNENUMERATED RIGHTS (1995); 2 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE
PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (Randy E. Barnett ed.,
1993); 1 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH
144
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that the Amendment was originally designed (at least in part) to reinforce the
limits of federal power. As discussed, Federalists and Antifederalists
generally agreed during the ratification period that the new Constitution
should limit federal power and protect individual rights, but differed over how
best to achieve these goals. Antifederalists thought that relying solely on an
enumeration of federal powers without a Bill of Rights would leave individual
rights insecure. Federalists countered that adding a Bill of Rights would
imply greater federal powers and thus actually threaten rather than protect
individual liberty.
Ultimately, the Founders’ solution to this dilemma was to proceed with a
Bill of Rights, but to include provisions expressly negating any implied
increase in federal powers or surrender of individual rights. This solution was
originally proposed by Antifederalists during the ratification debates. For
example, the Federal Farmer suggested that “we might advantageously
enumerate the powers given, and then in general words . . . declare all powers,
rights and privileges, are reserved, which are not explicitly and expressly
given up.”149 George Mason pressed this solution at the Virginia Ratifying
Convention:
[T]here ought to be some express declaration in the Constitution,
asserting that rights not given to the general government were
retained by the states. . . . [U]nless this was done, many valuable
and important rights would be concluded to be given up by
implication.150
The Founders’ decision to adopt this approach undercuts Professor
Kramer’s suggestion that “the scope of judicial review in areas like . . .
individual rights may have little relevance when it comes to assessing the
Court’s practice in the historically distinct domain of federalism.” 151

AMENDMENT (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989); Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth
Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1988); Calvin R. Massey, The Natural Law Component
of the Ninth Amendment, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 49 (1992); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Ninth
Amendment and the “Jurisprudence of Original Intent,” 74 GEO. L.J. 1719, 1730 (1986);
Jordon J. Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth Amendment: A New Form of Guarantee, 60
CORNELL L. REV. 231 (1975); Symposium, Interpreting the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.KENT L. REV. 37 (1988); John Choon Yoo, Our Declaratory Ninth Amendment, 42 EMORY
L.J. 967 (1993).
149 The full passage reads as follows:
[A]s men appear generally to have their doubts about these silent reservations, we might
advantageously enumerate the powers given, and then in general words, according to the
mode adopted in the 2d art. of the confederation, declare all powers, rights and privileges,
are reserved, which are not explicitly and expressly given up. People, and very wisely too,
like to be express and explicit about their essential rights, and . . . there are infinite
advantages in particularly enumerating many of the most essential rights reserved in all
cases; and as to the less important ones, we may declare in general terms, that all not
expressly surrendered are reserved.
Federal Farmer, An Additional Number of Letters to the Republican (May 2, 1788), in 17
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 265, 343 (John P.
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1995).
150 Debates of the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 14, 1788), in 2 THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 797, 797 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971) [hereinafter THE
BILL OF RIGHTS].
151 Kramer, supra note 15, at 288.
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Although the absence of a Bill of Rights did not prevent the minimum
number of states from ultimately ratifying the Constitution, it did pose a
potential threat to the future stability of the Union. Only four of the first nine
states (Delaware, New Jersey, Georgia, and Connecticut) ratified the
Two
Constitution without substantial discussion of amendments.152
conventions (Pennsylvania and Maryland) ratified, but appended minority
reports urging alterations and amendments.153 Three states (Massachusetts,
South Carolina, and New Hampshire) ratified the Constitution, but proposed a
variety of alterations or amendments for consideration by Congress.154 Both
Virginia and New York ratified the Constitution, but called for a second
federal convention to adopt amendments.155 North Carolina proposed
additional amendments and refused to ratify the Constitution until
amended.156 Finally, Rhode Island rejected the Constitution in a special
election and refused to reconsider before the First Federal Congress.157
These events made a strong impression on James Madison,158 who won
election to the First Congress from Virginia only after reversing his earlier
position and publicly supporting consideration of a Bill of Rights by
Congress.159 True to his word, Madison introduced a set of amendments in
the House on June 8, 1789.160 In addition to singling out specific individual
rights for protection, Madison proposed more general protections in the form
of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. The Tenth Amendment was the only
provision of the Bill of Rights “proposed by every one of the state ratifying
conventions that proposed amendments.”161 The Ninth Amendment, by

152

CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS x (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter CREATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS].
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at x–xi.
156 Id. at xi.
157 Id.
158 In a letter to Richard Peters on August 19, 1789, Madison warned that without a
Bill of Rights, opponents of the Constitution would “blow the Trumpet for a second
Convention,” and that “[s]ome amendts. are necssy. for N. Carol[in]a.” Id. at 282.
Similarly, Madison reminded the First Congress: “It cannot be a secret to the gentlemen in
this house, that, notwithstanding the ratification of this system of government by eleven of
the thirteen United States . . . ; yet still there is a great number of our constituents who are
dissatisfied with it; among whom are many . . . respectable for the jealousy they have for
their liberty, which, though mistaken in its object, is laudable in its motive.” Id. at 78.
159 Id. at 159. Madison wrote to Richard Peters: “If the Candidates in Virga. for the
House of Reps. had not taken this conciliary ground at the election, that State would have
[been] represented almost wholly by disaffected characters, instead of the federal reps. now
in Congs.” Id. at 282. The First Congress was comprised primarily of Federalists, but on
March 29, 1789, Madison wrote to Thomas Jefferson: “Notwithstanding this character of the
Body, I hope and expect that some conciliatory sacrifices will be made, in order to
extinguish opposition to the system, or at least break the force of it, by detaching the
deluded opponents from their designing leaders.” Id. at 225.
160 See id. at 11–14. According to Professor Wilmarth, “Madison sponsored the Bill of
Rights in the First Federal Congress both to persuade moderate Antifederalists to accept the
Constitution, and to fulfill his own campaign pledge.” Wilmarth, supra note 116, at 1264.
161 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 123
(1998); see also Wilmarth, supra note 116, at 1281–82 (“No other proposed amendment
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contrast, was an innovation specifically designed to guard against the danger
posed by adding a finite Bill of Rights. As one member of the House
explained, “unless you except every right from the grant of power, those
omitted are inferred to be resigned to the discretion of the government.”162
Upon introducing the Bill of Rights in the first Congress, Madison
underscored the function of the Ninth Amendment:
It has been objected also against the bill of rights, that, by
enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would
disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumeration;
and it might follow, by implication, that those rights which were
not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the
General Government, and were consequently insecure. This is
one of the most plausible arguments I ever heard urged against the
admission of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be
guarded against. I have attempted it, as gentlemen may see by
turning to the last clause of the 4th resolution.163
As originally introduced, the clause to which Madison referred provided:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in
favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish
the just importance of other rights retained by the people, or as to
enlarge the powers delegated by the constitution; but either as
actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater
caution.164
As amended, this proposal became the Ninth Amendment,165 and seemed
to answer the most serious objections to a Bill of Rights. The Amendment
ensured that the Bill of Rights would be understood not as an enlargement of
federal powers, but merely “as an enumeration of exceptions to the
enumeration of powers.”166 Thus, for example, although Richard Parker still
thought “a Bill of rights not necessary,”167 he conceded that “I have no
objection to such a bill of Rights as has been proposed by Mr. Maddison [sic]
was included in the proceedings of all eight state conventions.”). As originally proposed by
Madison, the provision that would become the Tenth Amendment stated: “The powers not
delegated by this constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states
respectively.” CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 152, at 14.
162 Id. at 87.
163 Id. at 83 (emphasis added); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 456 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
164 Madison Resolution (June 8, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 152, at 11, 13; 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 163, at 452. Madison’s proposal
appears to have been based in part on an amendment recommended by the Virginia
Ratifying Convention. That amendment provided that constitutional restrictions on
Congress’s powers should not be construed “in any manner whatsoever, to extend the
powers of Congress,” but should be understood only “as making exceptions to the specified
powers . . . or otherwise, as inserted merely for greater caution.” Debates of the Virginia
Ratifying Convention (June 24, 1788), in 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 150, at 814,
819.
165 U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”).
166 Hamburger, supra note 95, at 12.
167 Letter from Richard Parker to Richard Henry Lee (July 6, 1978), in CREATING THE
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 152, at 260, 260.
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because we declare that we do not abridge our Rights by the reservation but
that we retain all we have not specifically given.”168
For Madison, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were designed to work
together to guard against the same danger: unwarranted expansion of federal
power at the expense of individual rights.169 As he explained in a letter to
George Washington, “If a line can be drawn between the power granted and
the rights retained, it would seem to be the same thing, whether the latter be
secured by declaring that they shall not be abridged, or that the former shall
not be extended.”170 The Ninth and Tenth Amendments, however, are not
“wholly redundant” of each other.171 Rather, as Akhil Amar has explained,
“each amendment complements the other without duplicating it.”172
According to Professor Amar, “[t]he Tenth says that Congress must point to
some explicit or implicit enumerated power before it can act,”173 while “the
Ninth warns readers not to infer from the mere enumeration of a right in the
Bill of Rights that implicit federal power in fact exists in a given domain.”174
The history of the Bill of Rights confirms that the Founders understood
that individual rights begin where federal power ends. Because they could not
agree whether liberty would be best protected by limiting powers or
enumerating rights, they ultimately adopted both mechanisms. As Professor
Hamburger explained:
Thus, the Constitution reserved rights in two diametrically
opposite ways. By specifying powers, it reserved to the people
the undifferentiated mass of liberty they did not grant to the
federal government—a general reservation of rights confirmed
and preserved through the Ninth Amendment. By specifying
168

Id.
See Wilmarth, supra note 116, at 1302 (explaining that “Madison understood that
the reservation of rights to the people in the ninth amendment, and the reservation of powers
to the states in the tenth amendment, would work together to restrain the extension of
congressional powers by implication”).
170 Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Dec. 5, 1789), in 5 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 429, 432 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904).
171 AMAR, supra note 161, at 123.
172 Id. at 123–24.
173 Id. at 124.
174 Id. In this sense, “the people’s unenumerated rights were not unwritten, for they
were reserved by the Constitution’s grant of powers to the federal government.”
Hamburger, supra note 95, at 3. Professor McAffee likewise concludes that the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments are not redundant:
On the residual rights reading, the ninth amendment serves the unique function of
safeguarding the system of enumerated powers against a particular threat arguably presented
by the enumeration of limitations on national power. If one takes seriously the Federalist
“danger” argument, it would seem to make sense for the framers of the Bill of Rights to
state explicitly that the enumeration of rights they provided neither exhausted the rights held
by the people nor undermined the system of enumerated powers. The tenth amendment, on
the other hand, answered a separate Antifederalist concern: that the omission of an express
provision reserving all not granted, as was included in the Articles of Confederation, would
be read to imply a government of general powers. The ninth and tenth amendments each
serve to secure the design of enumerated powers and reserved rights and powers against the
distinctive threats perceived to flow from listing exceptions to powers not granted and
relying on implication rather than on express reservation.
McAffee, supra note 123, at 1306–07.
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rights, the Constitution reserved some particular rights so that, for
these, Americans would not have to rely merely upon the
enumeration of powers. The distinct advantage of each method of
reserving rights was repeatedly pointed out by its proponents.175
For this reason, it is historically inaccurate for modern commentators to
draw a bright line between the Constitution’s rights-bearing provisions and its
power-granting provisions.176 Both sets of provisions were understood to be
interlocking mechanisms designed to safeguard individual liberty.
D.

Judicial Review Under the Bill of Rights

Professor Kramer believes that the “Framers of the Constitution
expected, and may even have hoped, that judges would be active in reviewing
the constitutionality” of federal statutes alleged to violate the Bill of Rights.177
There is substantial evidence to support this conclusion. At the outset, it is
worth noting that many of the rights set forth in the Bill of Rights govern the
functioning of the judiciary itself. For example, the Fourth Amendment
provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause”;178 the Fifth
Amendment provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself”;179 the Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal
defendants “the right to a speedy and public trial”;180 the Seventh Amendment
preserves “the right of trial by jury” in civil cases;181 and the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the imposition of “[e]xcessive bail,” “excessive fines,”
or “cruel and unusual punishments.”182 These provisions would be ineffectual
if courts could not follow their commands in the face of contrary federal
statutes.
One might attempt to confine judicial review to those provisions of the
Bill of Rights addressed specifically to the judiciary. Under this approach,
provisions designed to restrict Congress (such as the First Amendment) would
essentially give rise to nonjusticiable political questions. There is little
support, however, for this approach. To the contrary, there is crucial evidence
that the Founders expected courts to enforce the Bill of Rights in its entirety.
For example, on March 15, 1789, Thomas Jefferson wrote to James Madison
in part to underscore “the legal check which it puts into the hands of the
judiciary”:
[I]n the arguments in favor of a declaration of rights you omit one
which has a great weight with me, the legal check which it puts
into the hands of the judiciary. [T]his body, which if rendered
independent & kept strictly to their own department merits great
175

Hamburger, supra note 95, at 31.
See Wilmarth, supra note 116, at 1297 (stating that “the Bill of Rights contains
explicit guarantees of federalism that most of the Framers had believed to be inherent in the
Constitution”).
177 Kramer, supra note 15, at 287–88.
178 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
179 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
180 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
181 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
182 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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confidence for their learning & integrity.183
Madison agreed and reiterated Jefferson’s point when he introduced the
Bill of Rights in the House of Representatives a few months later.
Responding to the argument that a Bill of Rights was “unnecessary” because
similar declarations had “been violated” in “a few particular states,”184
Madison explained that judicial review would guard against similar violations
by the federal government:
If they are incorporated into the constitution, independent
tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner
the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable
bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or
executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment
upon rights expressly stipulated for in the constitution by the
declaration of rights.185
This is an express statement by the sponsor of the Bill of Rights that
courts would enforce the proposed amendments against “every encroachment
upon rights” and against “every assumption of power.”186 Significantly, no
member of the House rose to dispute Madison’s understanding. At this point,
judicial review to enforce the Constitution was apparently uncontroversial.
III. Implications for Judicial Review
The Supremacy Clause and the Bill of Rights provide strong evidence
that the Founders expected courts to review federal statutes to ensure
compliance with all parts of “[t]his Constitution.”187 The decision to include
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments in the Bill of Rights confirms the Founders’
understanding that “the rights retained” by the people could be secured by
“declaring that they shall not be abridged, or that [the power granted] shall not
be extended.”188 As Madison explained, both methods “would seem to be the
same thing.”189 Thus, contrary to modern suggestions, courts cannot separate
183 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), in CREATING THE
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 152, at 218, 218.
184 Debates in the House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 152, at 69, 83.
185 Id. at 83–84.
186 Madison’s expectations regarding judicial review are consistent with the views he
expressed several years earlier. At the Convention, Madison favored adoption of the
proposed Constitution by “State Conventions” rather than state “Legislatures.” Notes of
James Madison on the Federal Convention (July 23, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra
note 44, at 93. His rationale was that legislative ratification might violate state constitutions
and cause courts to invalidate such measures. As he put it, “A law violating a constitution
established by the people themselves, would be considered by the Judges as null & void.”
Id. This argument carried the day and the Convention voted nine states to one to submit the
proposed Constitution “to assemblies chosen by the people.” Id. at 93–94. In light of these
remarks, Madison undoubtedly expected judicial review under the United States
Constitution as well because that instrument—like the state constitutions he discussed—was
to be “established by the people themselves.” Id. at 93.
187 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
188 Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Dec. 5, 1789), in 5 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 170, at 429, 432.
189 Id.

2003]

Unitary Judicial Review

349

judicial review of the scope of federal power from judicial review to enforce
individual rights without threatening many of the rights “retained by the
people.”
This “enumerated-powers, federalism-based reading”190 of the Ninth
Amendment suggests that the people retained innumerable rights against the
federal government.191 These include what Philip Hamburger describes as
“trivial rights,”192 echoing the language of Federalists who used sarcasm and
ridicule following ratification to make their point that the Bill of Rights was
either unnecessary or dangerous.193 For example, in debating the need for an
amendment to secure the right of assembly, Representative Sedgwick of
Massachusetts maintained that an enumeration of this right was unnecessary.
Specifically, he thought both that the right of assembly “is a self-evident,
unalienable right which the people possess” and have not authorized Congress
to abridge;194 and that the right, in any event, was already implicit in the
freedom of speech.195 Sedgwick argued that if an amendment for this purpose
was necessary, then the House
might have gone into a very lengthy enumeration of rights; they
might have declared that a man should have a right to wear his hat
if he pleased; that he might get up when he pleased, and go to bed
when he thought proper; but [I] would ask the gentleman whether
he thought it necessary to enter these trifles in a declaration of
rights, in a Government where none of them were intended to be
infringed.196
As Professor Hamburger points out, Sedgwick’s remarks echoed earlier
arguments made during the ratification debates.197
For example, in December 1787, Oliver Ellsworth responded to
Antifederalist complaints that the Constitution failed to secure the liberty of
the press by equating this omission with the failure to specify numerous other
rights:
Nor is liberty of conscience, or of matrimony, or of burial of the
dead; it is enough that Congress have no power to prohibit either,
and can have no temptation. This objection is answered in that the
states have all the power originally, and Congress have only what
the states grant them.198

190

AMAR, supra note 161, at 123–24.
See Hamburger, supra note 95, at 30 (“Both Federalists and Anti-Federalists agreed
that the rights of Americans were innumerable.”).
192 Id. at 1.
193 See supra notes 118–176 and accompanying text.
194 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 163, at 759.
195 Id. (“If people freely converse together, they must assemble for that purpose . . . .”).
196 Id. at 759–60. Not everyone agreed that the right to wear a hat was so trivial and
therefore unlikely to be infringed. A Federalist from Virginia responded to Sedgwick by
pointing out that “such rights have been opposed, and a man has been obliged to pull off his
hat when he appeared before the face of authority.” Id. at 760.
197 Hamburger, supra note 95, at 24.
198 [Oliver Ellsworth], A Landholder VI, CONN. COURANT, Dec. 10, 1787, reprinted in
3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 144, at 487, 490.
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Ellsworth’s point was that the Constitution protected individual liberty by
limiting federal power. As Thomas McAffee put it, “the founding generation
was very comfortable with the idea that structural provisions, including
provisions that define governmental powers and clarify that powers not
granted are reserved, constitute individual rights provisions of the first
order.”199 The Ninth Amendment reflects this understanding, and ensures that
the “enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”200
Professor Kramer fails to appreciate the relationship between individual
rights and limited federal powers reflected in the Ninth Amendment. In his
view, “[t]he most logical reading of the Ninth Amendment’s reference to
‘other’ rights ‘retained by the people’ . . . is to rights already or potentially
secured within the customary constitutional tradition.”201 To be fair, Kramer
made this observation in the course of refuting the conclusion of modern
commentators that the Amendment “was meant to preserve recognition of
some ill-defined body of natural rights.”202 But neither the “customary
constitution” interpretation nor the “natural rights” approach actually reflects
how Madison understood the Amendment in historical context. As discussed,
he included the Ninth Amendment in order to guard against any implication
that rights not specified in the Bill of Rights “were intended to be assigned
into the hands of the General Government, and were consequently
insecure.”203 Once one appreciates the original function of the Ninth
Amendment, it is difficult to conclude that the Founders considered questions
relating to individual rights to be qualitatively different from questions
concerning the scope of federal powers. To the contrary, the entire history of
the Bill of Rights suggests that both Federalists and Antifederalists understood
individual rights and limited federal powers to be flip sides of the same
coin.204
Given this understanding, there is little historical basis for Professor
Kramer’s suggestion that the Founders intended courts to enforce individual
rights but not to police the scope of federal powers. In fact, if accepted, this
dichotomy would give rise to the very danger that opponents of the Bill of
Rights feared: courts would protect only those rights specified in the
Constitution and leave Congress free to invade all other rights retained by the
people. The Antifederalists proposed—and the Federalists embraced—the
Ninth Amendment precisely to avoid this result. Thus, by whatever means
one approaches the relevant history, the events surrounding the adoption of
the Bill of Rights tend to refute—rather than support—Professor Kramer’s

199

McAffee, supra note 123, at 1225.
U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
201 Kramer, supra note 4, at 40.
202 Id. at 39.
203 Debates in the House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 152, at 69, 83; 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 163, at 456.
204 See McAffee, supra note 123, at 1226 (“The logic of the original Federalist
objection to a bill of rights had been stated in terms of avoiding both enlarged powers and
the elimination of retained rights: in this context, ‘rights’ and ‘powers’ are two sides of the
same coin.”).
200
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thesis.205
Once one places the Ninth and Tenth Amendments in their historical
context, it is not surprising that Madison considered both amendments
essential to the preservation of individual liberty. Commentators sometimes
regard one or both amendments as out of place in the Bill of Rights. The first
eight amendments, it is said, deal with individual rights, whereas the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments concern only the collective rights of the people and
the states.206 But once one recognizes that the Founders understood individual
rights to depend primarily on the absence of federal power, it was at least as
important to the cause of freedom for the Founders to limit federal power as it
was to enumerate particular rights. From this perspective, all ten amendments
function to protect individual liberty against federal interference. Thus, courts
could not decline to review the scope of federal powers without necessarily
failing to protect individual rights as understood by the Founders.
The controversy surrounding the infamous Sedition Act207 provides an
example. In 1798, Federalists enacted a statute making it a crime to “write,
print, utter or publish . . . any false, scandalous and malicious” words about
the president or Congress.208 As Akhil Amar notes, the Sedition Act “was a
textbook example of attempted self-dealing among the people’s agents; it
criminalized libel of incumbents, but not challengers,” and it “conveniently
provided for its own expiration after the next election.”209 Antifederalists, like
James Madison, attacked the constitutionality of the Act. In so doing,
however, Madison did not rely exclusively—or even primarily—on the First
Amendment. Rather, his principal argument was that Congress lacked
express or implied power to punish seditious libel or otherwise regulate the
press.210
The Sedition Act expired in 1801, thus denying the Supreme Court the

205 In this sense, although Professor Kramer claims that his views represent the original
understanding of judicial review, they are much more in keeping with the sentiments of
modern commentators than those of the Founders. As Philip Hamburger points out, “the
general protection of unenumerated rights by means of the enumeration of powers has been
so thoroughly undermined that many modern legal scholars may wonder how it could once
have been taken seriously.” Hamburger, supra note 95, at 32.
206 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1688 n.1 (2d ed.
1988) (noting that the “Bill of Rights, the first eight amendments to the Constitution, on
their face constrain only the conduct of the federal government”); Chief Justice Robert N.
Wilentz, The New Constitution, Speech at Princeton University (Jan. 15, 1985), in Speeches
by Chief Justice Robert N. Wilentz, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 887, 890 (1997) (stating that the
Bill of Rights is “usually thought of as the first eight amendments to the United States
Constitution”).
207 Act of July 14, 1798, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801).
208 Id.
209 AMAR, supra note 161, at 23.
210 See James Madison’s Report on the Virginia Resolutions (1799–1800), in 4
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 140, at 546, 561–68; see also
Wilmarth, supra note 116, at 1312 (“The Tenth Amendment established, in Madison’s
opinion, a presumption in favor of reserved state powers and placed the burden on the
federal government to prove that its actions were authorized by powers ‘enumerated in the
Constitution, and such as were fairly incident to them.’” (quoting James Madison’s Report
on the Virginia Resolutions (1799–1800), in 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS, supra note 140, at 546, 571)).
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opportunity to consider its constitutionality. Had a case reached the Court,
however, Professor Kramer’s position suggests that the Court should have
entertained arguments that the Act violated the First Amendment, but not that
it exceeded Congress’s enumerated powers. This undoubtedly would have
surprised James Madison and would have left individuals prosecuted under
the Act in a precarious position. At the time, the First Amendment did not
obviously apply to the Sedition Act because it “was regarded as guaranteeing
nothing more than the common law definition of freedom of the press: the
freedom to publish without prior restraint.”211 As numerous Founders
recognized, the more fundamental protection of the freedom of the press
flowed from the fact that the “power of Congress does not extend to the
Press.”212
Professor Kramer argues eloquently that the “special role of the Supreme
Court in protecting individual rights scarcely needs justification.”213 He
nonetheless goes on to explain, “Questions of individual right are, practically
by definition, least well handled by majoritarian institutions and better dealt
with in a forum whose structure and culture encourage deliberation and
attention to principle over expediency or immediate interest.”214 The Sedition
Act provides a glaring example of the threat posed by “majoritarian
institutions” to individual liberty. Yet, Professor Kramer’s ahistorical
dichotomy between “rights” and “powers” would have deprived individuals
prosecuted under the Act of effective judicial review.
The limited nature of federal power, of course, does not merely protect
the freedom of the press. As the Founders expected, it would protect
innumerable rights—such as the right to wear a hat, to marry, or to bury the
dead—against federal interference.215 United States v. Lopez216 provides a
modern example. There, the Supreme Court ruled that the federal Gun-Free
School Zones Act—criminalizing mere possession of guns in a school zone—
exceeded the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers.217 This conclusion
211 Gary D. Rowe, Note, The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin,
the Jeffersonian Ascendancy, and the Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 YALE
L.J. 919, 936 (1992) (citing LEONARD W. LEVY, THE EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 220–349
(1985)).
212 Notes of James Madison on the Federal Convention (Sept. 14, 1787), in 2
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 44, at 612, 618; see supra notes 110–138 and
accompanying text.
213 Kramer, supra note 4, at 126.
214 Id. For an exploration of similar themes as applied to the modern administrative
state, see Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State:
Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary’s Structural Role, 53 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 12–41 (2000) (explaining that the Founders expected the judiciary—unlike the
political branches—to exercise “judgment” rather than “will”).
215 See supra notes 108–146 and accompanying text. For example, the desire to
preserve such local rights against federal interference arguably animates the judiciallyrecognized domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction, which generally prevents
federal courts from hearing divorce, alimony, and child custody cases. See, e.g., 7
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 693–701 (1992). But cf. Naomi R. Cahn, Family
Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA. L. REV. 1073 (1994) (criticizing the
domestic relations exception).
216 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
217 Id. at 551.
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made it unnecessary for the Court to determine whether the Act also violated
the right “to keep and bear Arms” within the meaning of the Second
Amendment.218 Assuming no Second Amendment violation, however, the
only potential constitutional protection that Mr. Lopez had against
interference by the federal government with his liberty was the limited nature
of Congress’s powers. Left to Congress’s unreviewable discretion, such
liberty would be insecure. Thus, like the rights enumerated in the first eight
amendments, “others retained by the people” would also seem to be “better
dealt with in a forum whose structure and culture encourage deliberation and
attention to principle over expediency or immediate interest.”219 Lopez
upholds this principle and gives continuing effect to the Founders’
understanding that “[l]iberty is secured . . . by the limitation of [federal]
powers.”220
Conclusion
Professor Kramer has made important contributions to our understanding
of judicial review through his exploration of its origins and development. His
suggestion that the propriety of judicial review turns on the nature of the
constitutional provision at issue, however, is ultimately unpersuasive.
Professor Kramer endorses judicial review to prevent states from interfering
with federal supremacy and to enforce the Constitution’s rights-bearing
provisions, but he disputes the historical basis for judicial review to police the
limits of federal power. This dichotomy collapses, however, in light of the
text of the Supremacy Clause and the Founders’ understanding regarding the
nature and source of individual rights vis-à-vis the federal government. The
Supremacy Clause permits courts to disregard state law only when it conflicts
with a federal statute “made in Pursuance” of “[t]his Constitution.” Thus, of
necessity, judicial review of state law often entails judicial review of the scope
of federal powers. Similarly, the Founders regarded the Bill of Rights as only
a partial enumeration of rights. The Ninth and Tenth Amendments confirm
that the people retained other rights by virtue of their limited delegation of
power to the federal government. For this reason, courts cannot uphold the
full range of individual rights contemplated by the Founders without taking a
unitary approach to judicial review—that is, by enforcing both the Bill of
Rights and the limits of federal power.
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U.S. CONST. amend. II.
Kramer, supra note 4, at 126.
220 Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 7, 1788), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 128, at 1006, 1012. Of course, there are legitimate differences over the proper
scope of federal powers, but such differences do not relieve courts of their obligation to
decide cases in accordance with the Constitution, which sometimes necessarily entails
ascertaining whether a specific federal statute falls within the scope of Congress’s
enumerated powers.
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